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CLOSING THE CARRIED INTEREST LOOPHOLE AND
THE IMPACTS ON VENTURE CAPITAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Rooted in the classic Robin Hood tale of taking money from the
rich and giving it to the poor, the debate over carried interest has
started to mature and catch the attention of politicians and members
of the public. Put simply, carried interest is a compensation vehicle in
the private equity industry that allows the general partner (GP) of a
fund to take a portion of partnership profits regardless of the size of
its own contributions.1 The largest criticism of carried interest is the
benefit of being potentially taxed at a long-term capital gains rate, as
opposed to an ordinary income tax rate.2 This issue has attracted the
attention of both sides of the aisle, as Democrats and Republicans
alike have offered solutions. Even President Trump has expressed in-
terest in eliminating the benefit.3 While the subject of carried interest
has been a topic of interest at the federal level,4 the states have like-
wise attempted to find ways to closing this so-called loophole, which is
what this Comment will analyze.
Specifically, the focus of this Comment is Illinois Senate Bill 1719
(the Illinois Bill), which was passed by the Illinois Senate in July of
2017 and has been on Session Sine Die during the drafting of this
Comment.5 Additionally, during the drafting of this Comment, the Il-
1. This is in comparison to investments made in a person’s individual capacity, an investment
strategy that exceeds the scope of this Comment, and the Illinois legislation that is the subject of
this Comment.
2. Judith Lewis Mernit, How the Carried-Interest Loophole Makes the Super-Rich Super-
Richer, MOYERS (June 23, 2016), http://billmoyers.com/story/carried-interest-loophole-makes-
super-rich-super-richer/. To note, long-term capital gains refer to the favorable tax rates between
0% and 20% that apply to certain types of qualifying income, as opposed to an individual’s
ordinary federal income tax rates that apply to income from wages, interest, and rent. Evan
Tarver, What Is the Difference Between Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052015/what-difference-between-income-tax-and-
capital-gains-tax.asp (last updated Apr. 19, 2019). Moreover, for carried interest to be taxed at
the applicable long-term capital gains rate, the underlying profits must come from investments
that are held for a minimum of three years. See discussion and sources cited infra note 24.
3. See JIM NUNNS ET AL., TAX POLICY CTR., AN ANALYSIS OF DONALD TRUMP’S TAX PLAN 2
(2015); Katy Osborn, This Is the Tax Loophole Obama, Bush, and Trump All Want to Close,
MONEY (Sept. 16, 2015), http://money.com/money/4036087/tax-loophole-carried-interest/.
4. See, e.g., Carried Interest Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 2295, 115th Cong. (2017).
5. S.B. 1719, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017). In the legislative process, a bill being
placed in Sine Die occurs when a particular congress ends. At such time, any legislation that has
671
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linois House of Representatives considered corollary legislation, Illi-
nois House Bill 4293, which has likewise been placed on Session Sine
Die.6 Despite its Sine Die status, the Illinois Senate Bill’s primary ad-
vocate, Senator Daniel Biss, has signaled a continued interest in pur-
suing this attack on carried interest. In particular, Senator Biss made
the Illinois carried interest tax a core part of his 2018 Illinois Gover-
norship campaign.7
Critics of the design of carried interest and its tax advantages rely
on the narrative of a tax loophole that exists only to help the rich get
richer, while the middle class suffers as a result.8 By focusing on the
partners of large private equity firms, the profit figures appear to jus-
tify these commentators’ conclusions.9 In particular, the CEO of
Blackstone Group earned just under $800 million from the private eq-
uity firm in 2015 alone.10 However, there is an important distinction to
keep in mind between private equity firms and venture capital firms.
Venture capital firms play a critical role in the early-stage develop-
ment of start-ups.11 Particularly, the companies targeted by venture
capital firms are associated with a high risk of failure, have smaller
revenue figures, and show signs of potentially high growth.12 Con-
versely, private equity firms invest significantly greater sums of money
in companies that carry much less risk due to their maturity.13 For
example, in 2016, private equity firms’ deals totaled $649 billion14
while venture capital firms’ deals totaled just $71.8 billion.15 Differen-
yet to be passed will likely be placed on Sine Die adjournment, which effectively means that
particular congress has permanently ended consideration of those bills. Mark Strand & Tim
Lang, What is a Sine Die Adjournment?, CONG. INST. (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.conginst.org/
2015/01/05/what-is-a-sine-die-adjournment/.
6. H.B. 4293, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2018) (designated Session Sine Die on Jan. 8, 2019).
7. Candidate Q&A: Daniel Biss, Democratic Candidate for Illinois Governor, QUAD-CITIES
ONLINE (Mar. 1, 2018), https://qconline.com/news/elections/candidate-q-a-daniel-biss-democrat
ic-candidate-for-illinois-governor/article_0e5d78fb-cace-536b-a80a-4bf7035e1b2f.html.
8. See Osborn, supra note 3.
9. Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, Just How Much Do the Top Private Equity Earners
Make?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/business/dealbook/just-
how-much-do-the-top-private-equity-earners-make.html.
10. Id.
11. What Is the Difference Between Private Equity and Venture Capital?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/020415/what-difference-between-private-equity-and-ven
ture-capital.asp (last updated Apr. 15, 2019) [hereinafter What Is the Difference].
12. Id.; see also generally Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 131.
13. See What is the Difference, supra note 11.
14. 2016 Annual U.S. PE Breakdown, PITCHBOOK (Seattle, Wash.), Jan. 19, 2017, at 5.
15. 3Q 2017 Venture Monitor, PITCHBOOK (Seattle, Wash.), Oct. 9, 2017, at 4. These figures
can potentially lead to a number of different conclusions; however, it is important to note that
private equity investments tend to be significantly larger compared to venture capital invest-
ments, especially in the earlier stages of venture capital funding. Given the difference in size of
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tiating between these two types of private funding sources is signifi-
cant to the analysis of this Comment because the risk appetite of
venture capital firms is by default higher than private equity firms in
order to accommodate the increased risk that a venture capital invest-
ment will prove unprofitable.
This Comment argues that targeting the carried interest tax scheme
of the private equity industry will cripple venture capital firms’ invest-
ment behavior, which could result in burdens—to venture capital
firms, their investors, start-ups, and state economies to name a few—
that outweigh benefits of targeting carried interest. In 2017, the Illi-
nois Senate passed the first bill of its kind in the State, which seeks to
impose a 20% “privilege tax” on GPs of private funds who receive
carried interest from their fund’s investments.16 Around the same
time, U.S. Representative Sander Levin introduced federal legislation
aimed at carried interest, which could expose a GP’s income from car-
ried interest to ordinary income tax rates instead of potentially long-
term capital gains tax rates.17 Similar to these and other proposals, the
proposed 20% privilege tax18 in Illinois is a redistribution scheme that
would ultimately cripple a flow of capital to emerging businesses and
will result in greater harms than benefits.
Further, this Comment will address the likelihood of venture capital
firms either leaving their current place of business for states that have
a more investor-friendly legislature or adjusting their compensation
structures to offset the decrease in gains they will incur due to addi-
tional taxes on carried interest. A measure like the Illinois privilege
tax will not merely decrease the profits earned by GPs of venture cap-
the average deal, it can logically be inferred that an investor committing significantly greater
sums of money in fewer deals would expect the investment to carry less risk of failure compared
to venture capital. For example, private equity funds may only invest in a single company, so
when analyzing the overall performance of the fund, the single company can make or break the
fund’s profits. In contrast, a venture capital fund that invests in multiple companies will likely
account for the potential failure of some of those companies by virtue of the nature of the com-
panies’ maturities. See generally Private Equity vs. Venture Capital: What’s the Difference?, IN-
VESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/020415/what-difference-between-pri
vate-equity-and-venture-capital.asp (last updated Apr. 15, 2019).
16. See Ill. S.B. 1719, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017).
17. See Carried Interest Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 2295, 115th Cong. (2017). This proposed
legislation marks the most recent attempt by Representative Levin to tackle carried interest. See
Samuel Olchyk & Chaim Gordon, Carried Interest Legislation Introduced in Congress, LEX-
OLOGY (May 19, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a17f9e42-842f-43a6-
bb15-d58f2ad5cefa. For a further discussion of U.S. Congressional attempts to pass a measure
targeting tax treatment of carry, see infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
18. As used in this Comment, the term “privilege tax” refers to a tax that is not designed as a
revenue raising measure, but instead a tax on a group of persons based on a perceived privilege
the particular group of persons enjoys.
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ital funds; it will also likely result in the tightening of the partners’
investment decision-making, thus crippling economic growth by re-
stricting a start-up company’s access to capital.
Part II begins by providing an overview of the history and mechan-
ics of carried interest and concludes with a discussion of how certain
proposed legislation intends to eliminate the favorable tax treatment
of carry.19 Part III will cover a range of the likely effects of Illinois’s
attempt to impose greater taxation on venture capital firms and the
consequences from imposing additional taxation of carry at the na-
tional level. Part IV will cover a set of potential responses from Illi-
nois’s venture capital community as an attempt to mitigate the effects
of the bill or escape it entirely.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section will begin with the history of carried interest and an
explanation of this complex topic. Then, it will explain the roots of
carried interest and provide an illustration of how GPs earn carry. Fi-
nally, this Section will provide an explanation of how carried interest
is currently taxed and how recently proposed legislation will attempt
to tackle carried interest tax advantages.
A. Carried Interest History and Explanation
The term “carried interest” can be traced back hundreds of years to
merchants in the Mediterranean who would carry cargo belonging to
others and earn 20% of the profits on the cargo for their services.20 In
today’s context, venture capital firms derive some of their compensa-
tion from the profits of their investments, like the Mediterranean
merchants, for carrying the risk of the investment.21
Carry is a contractual right that entitles GPs of private funds to a
profits interest in the fund partnership, which is typically set at 20% of
the profits generated by the fund.22 Thus, for tax purposes, the income
GPs recognize by receiving carry is treated as a share of the underly-
19. “Tax treatment of carry” may also be referred to as “taxation of carried interest;” as such,
the two terms should be interpreted the same throughout this Comment.
20. Andrew Romans, The Term Carried Interest Goes Back to the Medieval Merchants in




22. What Is Carried Interest, and How Should It Be Taxed?, in THE TAX POLICY CENTER
BRIEFING BOOK: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE TAX SYSTEM AND TAX POLICY (Frank Sammartino
et al. eds.) (ebook), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-carried-interest-and-
how-should-it-be-taxed (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
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ing income or gain recognized by the fund.23 As a result, GPs are able
to earn carry that is treated not as ordinary income, but as long-term
capital gains, provided the fund sells qualifying assets that have been
held for a three-year period.24 Assuming the GPs’ income is taxed at
the highest tax bracket, the resulting long-term capital gain from the
carry is likely taxed at 23.8%.25 Carry is used as a compensation struc-
ture for the GPs of private investment funds, regardless of the size of
the GPs’ contributions.26 In addition to receiving a fixed percentage of
fund profits, GPs also receive annual fees for the management of the
investment fund, which are equal to a small percentage of the fund’s
committed capital.27 These annual fees are commonly known as man-
agement fees and a 2% fee is typical.28 However, unlike carry, these
management fees are taxed at ordinary income tax rates.29 Taken to-
gether, the industry term for a 2% management fee and the 20% car-
ried interest compensation structure is known as “two and twenty.”30
To illustrate fund operations and carried interest, the following ex-
ample explains a simple fund formation and distribution resulting in
carry. The hypothetical Private Investment Fund, L.P. (PIF) raises a
$10,000,000 fund and the fund investors (limited partners, or LPs) do
not require specified returns (known as “hurdle”)31 on their invest-
23. Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H, Kahn, The Fallacious Objections to the Tax Treatment of
Carried Interest, 20 FL. TAX REV. 319, 326 (2017).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 1061(d)(1)(A) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); Matthew Frankel, Long-Term Capital
Gains Tax Rates in 2017, MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 11, 2016, 6:47 AM), https://www.fool.com/retire
ment/2016/12/11/long-term-capital-gains-tax-rates-in-2017.aspx; Matthew Goldstein, Senate, Like
House, Opts to Keep Tax Break for Rich that Trump Vowed to End, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/business/republican-tax-plan-carried-interest.html. Not-
withstanding the long-term capital gains treatment, the taxation on a GP’s ordinary income
would be based on an individual’s taxable income, which taxes respective marginal income tax
brackets at rates that range between 10% and 37%. 26 U.S.C. § 1(j) (Supp. V 2018).
25. See Goldstein, supra note 24. In addition to long-term capital gains, the Internal Revenue
Code’s Net Investment Income Tax imposes an additional 3.8% surcharge to the net investment
income of taxpayers who have income in excess of the statutory threshold. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 1411(a)(1) (2012).
26. James Chen, Carried Interest, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/carried
interest.asp (last updated Feb. 11, 2019).
27. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008).
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 9–10. Rightfully so, management fees are the primary fee paid by limited partners to
cover the venture capital firm’s administrative overhead and salaries for partners and non-part-
ners, and will generally exist as a fixed amount regardless of how the fund performs. Id.
30. Id. at 1.
31. This rate of return is otherwise known as a hurdle rate, which reflects a defined amount
that must be distributed back to the limited partners before any of the GPs are able to receive
allocations from the sale of assets. Craig Hart, Hurdle Rates for PE/VC Funds: An Overview, VC
EXPERTS, https://www.vcexperts.com/buzz_articles/189 (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
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ments. In the fund’s agreement, the GP of PIF will be entitled to 20%
carried interest for managing the partnership and 2% management
fees. Assuming PIF operates for ten years, this will result in $2,000,000
in management fees that are paid annually ($200,000 per year), which
is taxed to the GP as ordinary income and leaves the original fund
with $8,000,000 of investable capital. In this hypothetical, PIF makes a
single $2,000,000 investment every year, exhausts all $8,000,000 from
the fund by Year Four, and sells all its investments for $15,000,000 in
Year Ten.32
By Year Ten, the LPs will have paid $2,000,000 in total management
fees to the GPs who will recognize the management fees as ordinary
income, which is forever out of the LPs’ hands and is not factored into
the fund’s profits. After selling the investments, the fund is left with
only $5,000,000 in profits, of which the GP takes 20% ($1,000,000) and
the LPs take 80% ($4,000,000). So, over ten years, the fund managed
to generate a 50% total return on all contributed capital,33 and be-
cause each of PIF’s investments were held for over three years, the
GP’s $1,000,000 will be taxed at the favorable long-term capital gains
rate, assuming that all of PIF’s underlying investments were in capital
assets.34 Ignoring the layers of complexities of the partnership struc-
ture, possible re-investable capital, and daily fund operations, the
above example provides a simple explanation of the process of receiv-
ing carried interest and how management fees impact profits.
Further, it should be noted that there are other valuable considera-
tions about calculating how and when carried interest is determined.35
First, there are two primary methods of calculating a fund’s carry: net
profits or gross profits.36 Under the net profits approach, the fund’s
expenses are subtracted from the fund’s profits before LPs’ and GPs’
carry is divided, allowing for a pro rata split of the expenses.37 Alter-
32. Depending on the company, some experts estimate that average holding periods of these
companies could be anywhere between six and eight years. Hans Swildens & Eric Yee, The
Venture Capital Risk and Return Matrix, INDUSTRY VENTURES (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.indus
tryventures.com/2017/02/07/the-venture-capital-risk-and-return-matrix/.
33. While the fund would return 50% of every dollar invested, the return on the capital that
PIF actually used for investing would be 87.5% as only $8 million of the $10 million was invested
in start-ups.
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222(1) (2012 & Supp. V 2018). However, if the investments were held for
less than the three-year period, the resulting distributions would not qualify for the favorable
long-term capital gains treatment. See 26 U.S.C. § 1061(d)(1)(A) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).




37. Id. According to the above example, if the expenses of PIF totaled $100,000, then to calcu-
late the carry for each party would mean that the $100,000 in expenses would be subtracted from
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natively, under the gross profits approach, the carry is calculated
before factoring in expenses because the carry is strictly based on
gain.38 Second, after determining how carried interest is calculated,
there are two methods for determining when carry is calculated.39 The
first, dubbed the “European Model,” requires all of the LPs’ capital
contributions to be returned before the GPs may participate in the
profits.40 The second, known as the “deal-by-deal” model, allows prof-
its and carry to be calculated after each distribution from an invest-
ment.41 Under the deal-by-deal model, GPs are generally able to
collect more profit through carry, but standard provisions, called
“clawback” provisions, exist in a limited partnership agreement to ac-
count for this. These provisions prevent the GPs from deriving more
benefits than they would otherwise receive under a European
Model.42
B. Taxing Carry and the Legislative Attempts to
Imposing Additional Taxes
Currently, when a venture capital firm establishes a new fund, it
typically opts to treat the fund as a partnership for tax purposes. Part-
nerships are a type of pass-through entity that allow profits to flow
through to partners in accordance with the partnership agreement.43
Assuming a two and twenty model, the GPs will then be entitled to a
20% profits interest upon the establishment of the partnership, al-
lowing the GPs to only be taxed when the partnership realizes gains.44
These partnerships, managed by their GPs, make decisions to invest in
particular start-ups in return for equity and will offer investment man-
the $1,000,000 profit to leave $900,000 for the LPs and GPs to split based on their carried inter-
ests. So, the LPs would take 80% of the $900,000 ($720,000 in carry) and the GPs would take
20% ($180,000 in carry). The expenses to factor in would be the management fees that go to-
wards paying the salaries of the firm’s staff and keeping the lights on, as well as expenses related
to legal, accounting, and other similar expenses. Asher Bearman, How VC Funds Work – Ex-
penses and Management Fees, VENTURE ALLEY (Jan. 12, 2011) https://www.theventurealley.com/
2011/01/how-vc-funds-work-expenses-and-management-fees/.
38. See Starin, supra note 35. Referring back to the PIF example, if PIF has $2,000,000 in
management fees and $5,000,000 profit, the carry will be calculated first to give the GPs their
20% ($1,000,000), and the LPs will be forced to bear the expenses, meaning their 80%
($4,000,000) will actually be reduced by the $2,000,000 in fund expenses, leaving them with
$2,000,000 at the end of the day.




43. Alan D. Viard, The Taxation of Carried Interest: Understanding the Issues, 61 NAT’L TAX
J. 447, 447 (2008).
44. Note, Taxing Partnership Profits Interests: The Carried Interest Problem, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1773, 1777–78 (2011).
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agement services to the company in order to increase the start-up’s
value.45 Therefore, because the partnership has an interest in a given
portfolio company, the partners will be taxed on the partnership’s
share of the income from the sale of the equity interest in a portfolio
company, initial public offering (IPO), or sale of the interest through a
secondary offering.46 Accordingly, under Sections 1(h) and 702(b) of
the Internal Revenue Code, as partnership profits pass to the firms’
partners, assuming the fund’s underlying assets are capital assets that
are held for at least three years, their income will be subject to long-
term capital gains rates between 0% and 20%47 plus an additional
3.8% tax in many cases.48
Recently, taxation in the United States has been a topic of signifi-
cant attention. In 2017, Representative Levin of the U.S. House of
Representatives introduced the Carried Interest Fairness Act of
2017,49 which would treat GPs’ carried interest as ordinary income for
income tax purposes instead of income that is potentially eligible for
long-term capital gains rates.50 While the several attempts by Repre-
sentative Levin appear to have failed to be advanced in the legislative
process, another bill, dubbed the Carried Interest Fairness Act of
2019, was reintroduced by Senator Tammy Baldwin and Representa-
tive Bill Pascrell in March of 2019 to revive Representative Levin’s
previous attempts at taxing carried interest.51
The effect of this legislation would only allow profits that GPs re-
ceive in proportion to their invested capital in the fund to be taxed at
long-term capital gains rates (provided that the fund’s underlying in-
come is long-term capital gain).52 The crux of this legislation depends
on whether the partnership qualifies as an “investment partnership.”
An investment partnership is defined as any partnership in which, at
the end of two consecutive calendar quarters, substantially all of the
partnership assets are specified assets and less than 75% of the part-
45. See Viard, supra note 43, at 446.
46. Id. at 447.
47. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
48. See 26 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1) (2012).
49. An identical bill was proposed by Representative Levin in 2015 and 2012, which failed to
gain traction in both years. Rep. Levin Takes Another Shot at Carried Interests, KPMG 1, https://
home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/04/rep-levin-takes-another-shot-at-carried-interest
.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
50. See Olchyk & Gordon, supra note 17.
51. Carried Interest Fairness Act of 2019, H.R. 1735, 116th Cong. (2019); Jessica Smith, Dem-
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nership capital is attributable to qualified capital interests constituting
property held in connection with the owner’s business or trade.53
Despite the numerous attempts of Representative Levin and any
support his bills targeting carry may have, the GOP tax bill passed at
the end of 2017 will likely hurt the chances of passing another major
tax bill in the near future. In December of 2017, Congress passed the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,54 which is heralded as one of the most signifi-
cant tax overhauls in decades.55 While the overhaul had impacts on
many areas of the tax code, the legislation was relatively silent on the
subject of carried interest.56 Rather than rely on the federal govern-
ment to act on the matter, several states have attempted to take a
stance against private fund managers to tax carry at the state level at
rates closer to ordinary income rates.
In particular, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo proposed legis-
lation—not long after the passage of the GOP tax bill—that would
impose a tax on fund managers equal to 17% of GPs’ carry.57 How-
ever, this New York proposal would only take effect if Connecticut,
New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania also enact legislation
targeting carried interest.58 Similarly, in 2018, New Jersey passed a bill
that would impose a 17% tax on GPs’ carry, the effect of which being
conditional on the passage of similar legislation in neighboring
states.59 Rhode Island also proposed a 19% tax on GPs’ carry that
53. See Rep. Levin Takes Another Shot at Carried Interests, supra note 49; see also 35 Ill.
Comp. Stat. § 5/1501(a) (11.5) (2012 & Supp. 2018) (defining “investment partnership”).
54. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq.).
55. Trump Hails ‘Largest Tax Cut’ in US History, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.bbc
.com/news/world-us-canada-42429424.
56. Sahil Kapur et al., How the Carried Interest Break Survived the Tax Bill, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 22, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-22/cohn-mnuchin-
split-helped-break-trump-s-carried-interest-pledge. The only change that affects the appeal of
carry is the addition of a three-year holding period before many private fund managers are able
to have their carry treated as long-term capital gains. See 26 U.S.C. § 1061 (2012 & Supp. V
2018).
57. States Continue to Propose Tax on Carried Interest – Recent Activity in New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island and Illinois, PWC (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/state-local-tax/
newsletters/salt-insights/assets/pwc-recent-carried-interest-proposals-in-nj-ny-ri-and-il.pdf.
58. States Continue to Propose Tax on Carried Interest, supra note 57; see also FY 2019 New
York State Executive Budget: Revenue, Article VII Legislation, H.R.J. Res 12674-01-8 (M),
203d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
59. States Continue to Propose Tax on Carried Interest, supra note 57; see also 2018 N.J. Sess.
Law Serv. Ch. 45 (Assemb. B. 3088) (West) (codified as amended at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:10A-6.4
(West 2018)).
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would take effect upon the enactment of federal legislation with iden-
tical effects.60
C. Illinois’s Answer to the Carried Interest Debate
In 2017, the Illinois Senate passed Senate Bill 1719 (the Illinois Bill)
in an attempt to impose additional taxation on GPs’ carried interest.61
The bill specifically targets the profits earned by investment partner-
ships and S corporations62 that conduct investment management ser-
vices.63 This tax would add a surcharge of 20% to the GPs’ carry in a
given taxable year, as opposed to the profits that would be earned
from each individual deal.64 Accordingly, GPs of Illinois funds apply-
ing a “two and twenty” scheme with $10 million in profits in one year
would traditionally pay GPs 20% on that $10 million, equal to $2 mil-
lion. Under the Illinois Bill, however, the $2 million allocated to the
GP would be reduced by 20%, leaving the GP with $1.6 million. The
20% surcharge essentially means that once the LPs’ capital contribu-
tions are all returned, the GPs’ carry in that taxable year will be sub-
ject to a 20% tax prior to any distributions.65
The Illinois Bill is unique compared to the Northeast states’ pro-
posed bills because Illinois would not require the passage of similar
legislation in neighboring states before taking effect.66 Further, com-
pared to other states’ attempts, the Illinois Bill was passed in the Illi-
nois Senate in May of 2017, and the companion bill in the Illinois
House, House Bill 4293, which have both since been placed on Session
60. States Continue to Propose Tax on Carried Interest, supra note 57; see also S.B. 2072, 2018
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2018). While this Rhode Island bill effectively died in committee,
it should still stand to highlight how state legislatures have expressed interest in acting to impose
additional tax on carried interest.
61. See S.B. 1719, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017).
62. In contrast to traditional C corporations, close corporations, or LLCs that seek pass-
through tax treatment akin to partnerships will first elect for the entity to be treated as a corpo-
ration, and then make an S corporation election under Internal Revenue Code § 1362(a) for
such tax treatment, provided that on the day such election is made all shareholders consent to
such election. See 26 U.S.C. § 1362(a) (2012). For the purpose of this Comment, such sharehold-
ers would include the partners of private funds seeking long-term capital gain treatment of the
distributions they receive from the S corporation.
63. See Ill. S.B. 1719.
64. Id.
65. Under the example in Section II.A, in Year Ten when PIF realized a gain of $300,000, that
gain would be subjected to a surcharge of $200,000 to cover this tax, and then the carry would be
split between the partners on the remaining $100,000. So, the GPs will instead receive $20,000 in
carry (assuming a net-profits approach), which will be taxed at the long-term capital gains rate of
each respective GP. This legislature would ultimately place additional burdens on the LPs whose
gains are cut when the aggregate fund profits are taxed.
66. See Ill. S.B. 1719.
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Sine Die.67 The future of carried interest is unclear at any level—fed-
eral or state—and the debate is far from over.
III. ANALYSIS
Legislation aimed at closing this “carried-interest loophole” will
create burdens to venture capital firms that exceed any benefits of
greater tax revenue that might come from the new tax schemes. Sec-
tion A analyzes how a “privilege tax” is an inadequate solution to the
issue of generating tax revenue from these investment transactions
and discusses the likely consequences that arise when these firms’
partners have to foot a greater tax burden. Section B discusses how
imposing greater taxation on venture capital firm partners alters their
investment decision-making, thus crippling start-up companies’ access
to capital. Section C argues that, in an economic climate with histori-
cally low interest rates and fewer sources of returns, the additional tax
will work to eliminate sources of greater returns that do not currently
exist in the public market. Finally, subsection D posits how the cost of
additional taxation on carry will likely fall back on the start-up compa-
nies, as venture capitalists’ business models change to adjust for the
new taxation schemes.
A. Flaws in Illinois’s Privilege Tax
The Illinois Bill’s primary weapon targeting carry is a privilege tax
that would impose a 20% tax on carry before the profits reach the
hands of the GPs.68 However, the traditional rule of thumb is that a
GP typically only commits approximately 1% of the total capital that
will be invested in a fund.69 Put simply, if a fund were to raise $100
million, the presumption would be that the GP only committed
$1,000,000. Therefore, in attempting to capture greater tax revenue
from a group that is supposedly unjustly enriched by carry, the Illinois
Bill would only penalize the GPs who receive 20% of the fund’s prof-
its and ignore the parties receiving the other 80%. This means that, of
the $1.1 billion of venture capital invested in 2015,70 and assuming a
20% return on the investment, Illinois would only generate $8.8 mil-
67. H.B. 4293, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018) (designated Session Sine Die on Jan.
8, 2019) (H.B. 4293 was the companion bill to Illinois Senate Bill 1719).
68. See S.B. 1719, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017).
69. Allen Latta, LP Corner: Thoughts on GP Commitment, ALLENLATTA (May 13, 2017),
http://www.allenlatta.com/allens-blog/lp-corner-thoughts-on-gp-commitment.
70. Amina Elahi, How Venture Capital Investments Stacked Up in Illinois in 2015, CHI. TRIB.
(Jan. 15, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-venture-capital-
illinois-2015-bsi-20160115-story.html. For a point of clarification, this $1.1 billion figure refers to
venture capital funding in Illinois companies, not necessarily funds invested by Illinois funds.
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lion in tax liability coming from GPs.71 This type of taxation would
then amount to an effective tax rate of approximately 39% on GPs
after accounting for long-term capital gain taxes.72 At those rates, Illi-
nois is just pushing GPs and business out of the State for the sake of
making artificial income parity.
TABLE 1. 2015 Total Venture Capital Investment of $1.1 Billion
with a 20% Return
Total Return $1,320,000,000.00 
Total Profit $220,000,000.00 
Groups Contributions Carry Post-Fee Profit73 
LPs (99%) $1,089,000,000.00 $176,000,000.00 $176,000,000.00 
GPs (1%) $11,000,000.00 $44,000,000.00 $35,200,000.00 
Post-Capital  
Gains Profits74 0% 15% 23.8% 
LPs (99%) $176,000,000.00 $149,600,000.00 $134,112,000.00 
GPs (1%) $35,200,000.00 $29,920,000.00 $26,822,400.00 
Percentage of Profits Retained Post Capital Gains75 
LPs (99%) 100% 85% 76% 
GPs (1%) 80% 68% 61% 
However, for the sake of the hypothetical, the $1.1 billion figure will be used from a hypothetical
Illinois funds’ perspective. Id.
71. A flat 20% return on $1.1 billion results in $220 million in profits, which—based on a
20%/80% split for carry—leaves GPs with $44 million in profits subject to the proposed 20%
privilege tax under the Illinois Bill.
72. See infra note 75 for an explanation of how GPs are potentially subjected to a 39% effec-
tive tax rate as outlined in Table 1.
73. This “Post-Fee Profit” highlights the amount of profit LPs and GPs take after the Illinois
privilege tax is applied. To note, because the privilege tax only applies to the GPs, the LPs’
“Post-Fee Profit” is unchanged from the carry they already take, while the GPs lose 20% of their
carry to the privilege tax.
74. For the sake of simplicity, the “Post-Capital Gains Profits” only looks at the amount of
profit LPs and GPs take after federal income tax rates are applied. While the hypotheticals used
in this Comment assume that the parties are high-income earners and are thus taxed at the
highest applicable federal income tax rates, the 0% and 15% rates are also displayed for inform-
ative purposes. Most importantly, though, is the 23.8% rate, which reflects the rate most likely to
apply to these hypothetical individuals comprising both the LPs and GPs.
75. Under this “Percentage of Profits Retained Post Capital Gains” portion of Table 1, the
percentages displayed represent the percentage of profits LPs and GPs actually take after ac-
counting for the figures in the “Post-Capital Gains Profits” section directly above. For example,
LPs at the 23.8% capital gains bracket have Post-Capital Gains Profits of $134,112,000.00, which
equates to approximately 76% of the original $176,000,000.00 “Post-Fee Profit.” Assuming the
income in the hypothetical as set out in Table 1 is the only income LPs or GPs receive in a given
year, one could also read this portion of Table 1 as identifying the effective tax rate of either
group. In particular, assuming the GPs in this hypothetical fall under the 23.8% rate and do not
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Assuming GPs are on average only committing 1% of the fund’s
total capital, Illinois would be ignoring the group that receives a much
bigger cut of the pie. Such a move begs the question of why the State
should devote its resources to punishing certain groups and inciden-
tally making tax revenue, when maximizing tax revenue should be the
primary goal. Further, considering that the average holding period76
of a venture capital investment is approximately eight years,77 GPs
have a lot of time to move these funds to neighboring states, thus
avoiding the privilege tax to the extent possible.78
Specifically, as this Comment focuses on the likely effects of the
Illinois Bill, an important consideration is the venture capital indus-
try’s geographic distribution. California is certainly the industry’s gi-
ant, making up over 50% of the industry’s investment total in the first
three months of 2018.79 However, the Midwest, and Chicago specifi-
cally, has been the hometown of “unicorns”80 like Groupon and
GrubHub. It is also the home of the nationally prominent 1871 incu-
bator81 and one of the number-one university accelerators, the Uni-
versity of Chicago New Venture Challenge.82 Thus, the Illinois plan
receive income from any other sources, it could be said their effective tax rate would amount to
approximately 39% (the difference between the 61% retained profits and 100% retained profits,
which would assume no Illinois privilege tax at all).
76. The term “holding period” refers to the period of time between an investor’s asset
purchase and the sale of the asset. Julia Kagan, Holding Period, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in
vestopedia.com/terms/h/holdingperiod.asp (last updated Apr. 21, 2019).
77. See Swildens & Yee, supra note 31.
78. I say “to the extent possible” because if it took GPs long enough to move the fund to a
neighboring state, such that there were liquidations in the pre-move period that are subject to
the privilege tax, the fund may still be on the hook for the 20% privilege tax but not for any that
occur after the move to the neighboring state. See 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/201(a) (2012 & Supp.
2018) (establishing that taxes are imposed on parties that earn or receive income in or as a
resident of Illinois).
79. Andrew Soergel, 4 States Control 80 Percent of Venture Capital Dollars, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., (May 10, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2018-
05-10/4-states-control-80-percent-of-venture-capital-dollars.
80. The term “unicorn” is the moniker given to start-up companies that reach a valuation of
$1 billion, which is a milestone that is estimated to be attained by only approximately 0.07% of
start-ups. James Chen, Unicorn, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unicorn
.asp (last updated Dec. 21, 2017).
81. 1871 is ranked as the number one university-affiliated technology hub. Mick Swasko, 1871
Celebrates Five Years as the Center of Chicago’s Tech Ecosystem, 1871 (May 2, 2017), https://1871
.com/press-releases/1871-celebrates-five-years-center-chicagos-tech-ecosystem/. Incubators play
an important role in the venture capital environment by providing work spaces and other re-
sources that assist early-stage start-ups in their development and growth. Jeffrey K. Cassin,
Could an Incubator or Accelerator Benefit Your Startup?, SCARINCI HOLLENBECK (Feb. 17,
2017), https://scarincihollenbeck.com/law-firm-insights/business-law/incubator-or-accelator-men
torship-programs/.
82. Yael Hochberg et al., 2017 Accelerator Rankings, SEED ACCELERATOR RANKINGS PRO-
JECT (2017), http://seedrankings.com/pdf/sarp_2017_accelerator_rankings.pdf. In contrast to an
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defeats the purpose of favorable long-term capital gains in venture
capital and could undercut Illinois’s venture capital industry. Staying
mindful of investors’ interests to maintain diverse portfolios, Illinois’s
plan only adds to the argument against committing capital to the risky
venture capital environment.
B. The Illinois Solution’s Disincentivizing Consequences
By creating greater barriers to venture capital funds’ ability to
profit off their investment services, the Illinois Bill, and others of its
kind, undermine the high-risk, high-reward incentive structure that
exists in venture capital. It helps to first understand that venture capi-
tal investments are among some of the riskiest investments that can be
made, and only 15%–20% of venture capital investments deliver posi-
tive returns.83 Further, when venture capital firms elect to invest in a
company, the money that is invested is generally tied up for an aver-
age of eight years.84 Put simply, for venture capital firms to have suffi-
cient incentive to invest capital into start-ups, the potential returns
need to be commensurate with the risk of tying up large sums of capi-
tal for nearly a decade in the high-risk ventures.
By having to forfeit 20% of carry from Illinois’s proposed privilege
tax, in addition to the amount that will be lost from capital gains taxes,
the Illinois Bill could push investors away from venture capital if there
are alternatives like the public market that can deliver a higher after-
tax, “risk-adjusted” return.85 For the GPs who are looking for the
incubator, accelerators are typically structured as formal training programs intended for early-
stage start-ups with more defined growth than counterparts participating in incubators, and typi-
cally offer equity funding in the companies as well. See Cassin, supra note 81.
83. Kenneth Freeman, Exploring Risk-Reward Tradeoffs in Venture Capital Investment Op-
portunities, FIN. POISE (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.financialpoise.com/exploring-tradeoffs-in-
venture-capital-investment-opportunities/.
84. See Kagan, supra note 76.
85. The term “risk-adjusted” as it relates to investment returns is a measurement of an invest-
ment’s true return when factoring in how much risk is involved with the particular investment.
See James Chen, Risk-Adjusted Return, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/
riskadjustedreturn.asp (last updated Dec. 20, 2018). For example, without factoring risk into an
investment’s return profile, if Fund A returns 7% on its venture capital investments and Fund B
returns 7% on its investments in publicly-traded stocks, one could infer the two funds are
equally successful in investing. However, as noted throughout this Comment, venture capital
investments are inherently riskier than investments in the public market. So comparatively, Fund
A’s 7% return is actually less successful than Fund B’s 7% return because Fund A’s risk-ad-
justed return should produce higher returns than the alternative of what can be achieved in the
“safer” public market. While this example comparing Fund A and Fund B glosses over many of
the mechanics behind what “risk-adjusted returns” actually means, the important takeaway is
that riskier investments should outperform safer investments. One method of measuring risk-
adjusted returns is through a fund’s “alpha,” which is discussed later in this Comment. See infra
notes 96–106 and accompanying text.
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fruits from high-risk investing, the additional layer of taxation on top
of the long-term capital gains tax brings GPs’ effective tax rate closer
to ordinary income tax rates.86 At that point, if these profits are taxed
at close to ordinary income tax rates, GPs are better off seeking re-
turns in the public market or holding on to their money instead of
investing altogether.
Instead, as one commentator has demonstrated, governments could
capture more revenue from investment activity by adjusting marginal
tax rates to push individuals to invest more in order to avoid higher
marginal tax rates.87 However, this commentator’s theory of igniting
greater investment activity would require effective tax rates that are
lower than marginal tax rates. In light of the 2017 GOP tax bill, as-
suming venture capital GPs are high-income earners,88 the marginal
tax brackets for these individuals were reduced to 32%, 35%, and
37%, down from 33%, 35%, and 39.6%, respectively.89 Thus, as out-
lined above, these high-income GPs would be subject to similar, if not
greater, tax rates for their role in venture capital.90
While existing GPs would surely be deprived of the incentive to stay
in the venture capital market, this effect would also have conse-
quences on the would-be GPs seeking to form new funds. When inves-
tors evaluate a venture capital firm’s performance, the go-to
benchmark is individual fund distributions to paid-in capital (DPI),
which accounts for the ratio of all distributions made to investors, di-
vided by the amount of capital that investors contributed.91 This mea-
surement is potentially subject to material impacts by the Illinois Bill
because as GPs lose 20% of their carry to the privilege tax, the likely
result of GPs adjusting the fund’s compensation structure away from
two and twenty would burden the existing benchmarks.
86. See Swildens & Yee, supra note 31.
87. Mike Kimel, How Tax Rates Affect Investment and Consumption – A Look at the Data,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2011, 2:56 PM), www.businessinsider.com/how-tax-rates-affect-invest
ment-and-consumption-a-look-at-the-data-2011-1.
88. “High-income earner” being defined as single taxpayers earning at least $157,500. Amy
Fontinelle, How the GOP Tax Bill Affects You, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
taxes/how-gop-tax-bill-affects-you/ (last updated Apr. 11, 2019).
89. Id.
90. See Swildens & Yee, supra note 31. The 20% privilege tax plus the 23.8% rate amounts to
an effective tax rate that is greater than ordinary income tax rates. See also supra Table 1.
91. E´le´onore Jarry-Ferron, Venture Capital 101: Making Sense of VC Returns, BRIGHTSPARK
VENTURES: BRIGHTSPARK BLOG (Jan. 31, 2017), http://blog.brightspark.com/venture-capital-101-
making-sense-of-vc-returns. For example, if a fund has a 1.0x (1.0 times) DPI, that would mean
the fund has effectively broken-even by generating returns equal to the amount of capital paid
into the fund.
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With average fund lifespans between eight and twelve years92 and
timelines for breaking-even to achieve a 1.0x DPI averaging approxi-
mately 8.47 years,93 GPs have thin margins for error to make money
in this business. The Illinois Bill would then hack away 20% of GPs’
profits earned by fund investments, crippling the incentive to establish
new venture capital firms or the ability of current players to remain
competitive. The effect of impairing GPs’ ability to stay competitive in
such a challenging market could potentially stop individuals from at-
tempting to enter. To adjust for the difference, GPs would have to
make an additional 25% on every dollar on their investments to be in
the same position if the Illinois Bill was not in effect.94 As a result, the
venture capital market is undercut from less total financing in emerg-
ing markets for companies that might otherwise prove to be
profitable.
C. Interest Rates, Alpha, and Venture Capital
Core to fiscal policy and how interest rates affect individual invest-
ing behavior is that when interest rates are low, individuals are incen-
tivized to invest their money to generate higher returns than most
savings accounts can generate.95 In the world of finance, professionals
measure investment performance by the investment’s “alpha,” or the
excess return of an investment relative to the return of a benchmark
index.96 For example, the illustration in section A that assumes an an-
nual 7% return in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index (S&P 500) would
represent the benchmark used to gauge the performance of an invest-
ment. Without devoting too much discussion into the fine mechanics
of measuring alpha, the concept of investment performance relative to
appropriate benchmarks is sufficient for this analysis.
92. Allen Wagner, The Venture Capital Lifecycle, PITCHBOOK (May 14, 2014), https://pitch
book.com/news/articles/the-venture-capital-lifecycle.
93. Michael Roth, What GPs Need to Know About the Private Equity J-Curve (and Why LPs
Care), COBALT (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.cobaltgp.com/what-gps-need-to-know-about-the-pri
vate-equity-j-curve/.
94. In the PIF hypothetical, if the GP were to pay Illinois’s proposed privilege tax, the GP
would be left with $800,000, as opposed to $1,000,000, or 16% of the $5,000,000 total profit. So
because $1,000,000 is 25% higher than $800,000, for the GP to get back to $1,000,000 in carry,
the fund will have to earn $6,250,000, or approximately 103.13% (2.03x DPI) on investable
capital.
95. Kira Brecht, 4 Ways Rising Interest Rates Will Affect Your Investments, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Oct. 9, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutu
al-funds/articles/2015/10/09/4-ways-rising-interest-rates-will-affect-your-investments.
96. James Chen, Alpha, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alpha.asp (last
updated Feb. 18, 2019).
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Additionally, interest rates in the United States97 have only started
growing since the period of historic lows that marked the all-time low
of 0.25% in late 2008.98 In particular, when considering the entire in-
vesting ecosystem, interest rates play a critical role in investors’ deci-
sions of where their money is best suited to grow.99 In theory, the
complicated relationship between investors’ risk appetite and interest
rates is such that when interest rates are low, investors can place more
capital in risky investments because the returns are much greater than
traditional investment strategies.100 The logic then follows that as in-
terest rates climb, investors have less incentive to place capital in risky
investments (e.g., venture capital) because they can now generate
safer returns through other investment vehicles.101
Therefore, with interest rates at historic lows, the goal of stimulat-
ing the economy by encouraging individuals to invest would not flow
to the venture capital industry if the returns are not as good as other
available public markets.102 Additionally, the movement towards ris-
ing interest rates in the near-term could potentially cast difficulty on
the venture capital industry as other investment vehicles also provide
97. Technically, the term “interest rate” as used in U.S. economic discussions is directly re-
lated to the “Federal Funds Rate,” which is a rate set by the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC). James Chen, Federal Funds Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp (last updated Apr. 18, 2019). The Federal Funds
Rate affects the U.S. economy by setting a rate for inter-bank lending on an overnight basis to
maintain reserve requirements that are established by the Federal Reserve. Id. As the Federal
Funds Rate increases, the U.S. money supply decreases and leads to higher interest rates, result-
ing in less overall investment spending. Id.; see also Jesse Neugarten, Do Lower Interest Rates
Increase Investment Spending?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/
101315/do-lower-interest-rates-increase-investment-spending.asp (last updated Mar. 14, 2019).
98. Kimberly Amadeo, Fed Funds Rate History with Its Highs, Lows and Chart with Major
Events: Why the Fed Changes Rates, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/fed-funds-rate-histo
ry-highs-lows-3306135 (last updated Mar. 15, 2019). During the drafting of this Comment, the
U.S. interest rate was between 1.25% and 1.5%, which is a rate that is so low that the last time
interest rates were at that level was in the 1960s. Kimberly Amadeo, Current Federal Reserve
Interest Rates and Why They Change: Why the Fed Funds Rate Rose to 2.5 Percent, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/current-federal-reserve-interest-rates-3305694 (last updated Jan. 15,
2019); see also Federal Funds Rate – 62 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, http://www.macro
trends.net/2015/fed-funds-rate-historical-chart (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
99. See Neugarten, supra note 97.
100. Matthew Johnston, Fed Raising Rates Affects Startup Funding, INVESTOPEDIA (June 30,
2015, 7:45 AM), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/063015/fed-raising-rates-
affects-startup-funding.asp [https://web.archive.org/web/20171103135426/http://www.investope
dia.com/articles/personal-finance/063015/fed-raising-rates-affects-startup-funding.asp].
101. This view of investing patterns as they relate to interest rates is in itself a topic suitable
for PhD dissertations, but is merely simplified in this Comment to demonstrate how economic
and fiscal policies have implications that bleed into almost any conceivable investment-related
medium.
102. Elian D. Alvarez, Interest Rates and Venture Capital, HACKERNOON (Oct. 2, 2017), https:/
/hackernoon.com/interest-rates-and-venture-capital-390429a83903.
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investors with safer returns over time. Thus, by imposing a privilege
tax that cuts profits, the taxing scheme would play a role in keeping
the venture capital industry from taking advantage of stimulating poli-
cies that exist with low interest rates and help fuel the industry’s
growth.103 As the economy shifts towards tightening policies from
higher interest rates, it makes little sense to pursue a tax that bullies
an industry that is highly exposed to risk as other public investment
sources become more profitable.
Additionally, if GPs change the two and twenty model enough to
the detriment of LPs, it would make more sense for an individual LP
to invest her capital commitments in the public market instead. Partic-
ularly, given the S&P 500104 average annual return of 7%,105 LPs in
the 23.8% long-term capital gains bracket could achieve the same re-
sults within three years and reinvest their profits over the same eight-
year holding period.106
TABLE 2. 7% Average Return for the S&P 500
LP Investment $1,089,000,000.00 
Years After 
Investment Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Return on 
Investment $1,165,230,000.00 $1,246,796,100.00 $1,334,071,827.00 
Percent Return 7.00% 14.49% 22.50% 
Profit $76,230,000.00 $157,796,100.00 $245,071,827.00 
Profits After 
Long-Term 
Capital Gains of 
23.8% $58,087,260.00 $120,240,628.20 $186,744,732.17 
103. Id.
104. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index is a collection of stocks that represents the most com-
mon benchmark of success in the U.S. stock market. Will Kenton & Chris Murphy, S&P 500
Index – Standard & Poor’s 500 Index Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/sp500.asp (last updated Apr. 19, 2019).
105. J.B. Maverick, What Is the Average Annual Return for the S&P 500, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042415/what-average-annual-return-sp-500.asp (last
updated Mar. 13, 2019).
106. Taking the figures from Table 1, these LPs would hypothetically contribute $1.089 billion
to the fund and have $134.112 million in profits after the fund had sold all of its investments. See
supra Table 1. In the alternative, LPs could experience significantly greater returns through the
public market instead. See infra Table 2.
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D. Who Really Pays When Venture Capitalists Pay More
Not only would the 20% tax cut away at GPs’ ability to demonstrate
real value to remain competitive in the industry, but these same GPs
would also be forced to adjust their investment decision-making to the
detriment of start-up companies. As fund managers deploy capital in
their investing activities, the threat of additional taxation potentially
skews a GP’s risk appetite away from early-stage financing107 and to-
wards more mature rounds where a company has demonstrated viable
business operations.108 Knowing that 20% of their profits will be
taken by the government, the GP of PIF has more incentive to invest
in companies that are more likely to produce returns and give the GP
a greater chance of making money, as opposed to longer-shots with
more frequent patterns of failure.109
To adjust for a lack of supply of venture capital financing, early-
stage companies could then turn to angel investors110 to carry their
business forward. The benefit for angels is that they do not have to
deal with the same hurdles that the Illinois Bill would present to in-
vesting partnerships and S corporations because their investments are
made in their individual capacities. However, in the third quarter of
2017, the global seed and angel deal volume only contributed to ap-
proximately 3.6% of the total deal volume in venture capital.111 In
107. In venture capital, investment types are broken down into different categories depending
on a company’s maturity, typically starting with “seed” and “pre-seed” funding, followed by
Series A, B, C, and beyond, which designate the types being offered in that particular round of
financing. Nathan Reiff, Series A, B, C Funding: How it Works, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in
vestopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/102015/series-b-c-funding-what-it-all-means-and-how-
it-works.asp (last updated Feb. 8, 2019). The seed rounds and Series A can be characterized as
early-stage financing where companies are in the infant stages of business, thus carrying the
highest risk for failure. Alisha Arora, What Does Series-A, Series-B, Series-C Funding Mean in
Startups, STARTUP FREAK, http://www.startupfreak.com/what-does-series-a-series-b-series-c-
funding-mean-in-startups/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
108. The loss-rate, or failure of an investment to return the original allocation, of later-stage
investments drops to 30%, compared to the typical early-stage loss-rate of 65%. See Swildens &
Yee, supra note 31.
109. In addition to later-stage companies having a significantly lower loss-rate, the invest-
ments in later-stage companies have shorter holding periods, which despite lower returns, could
provide more opportunities to invest in more companies to make up for the difference in re-
turns. See id.
110. Angel investors are individual people who invest capital into companies in smaller
rounds before venture capitalists enter to help jumpstart a company’s business development.
How Do Angel Investors Differ from Venture Capitalists, ROCKIES VENTURE CLUB, https://www
.rockiesventureclub.org/colorado-capital-conference/how-do-angel-investors-differ-from-ven
ture-capitalists/? (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
111. Jason D. Rowley, Q3 2017 Global Report: VC Deal and Dollar Volume Projected to
Reach Post-Dot Com Highs, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Oct. 3, 2017), https://news.crunchbase.com/
news/q3-2017-global-report-vc-deal-dollar-volume-projected-reach-post-dot-com-highs/.
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addition to a relatively small total amount of financing coming from
angel investors, these investors do not have the luxury of managing
institutional investors’ funds, so the ability to invest is limited to the
funds in their own personal accounts. Put simply, given this viable
source of funding, the angel investing market is not large enough to
carry the total early-stage deal volume.112
In addition to reducing potential funding that early-stage companies
could receive, the lasting impact could result in these companies creat-
ing fewer jobs to generate tax revenue. Between 1979 and 2013, one
study found that venture capital-backed start-ups that successfully
reached their IPO reflected approximately $4.3 trillion in total market
capitalization value113 and contributed 38% of the employees of all
these companies.114 While it is not entirely clear how much venture
capital funding played a role in the companies’ ability to scale and
reach an IPO, venture capital certainly played a role in the entire
scheme and assisted in the creation of large revenues and jobs.115 In
this same period, over 2,600 venture-capital-backed companies had
IPOs,116 and if each one of these companies had only 10 employees,
the tax revenue from company profits and employee salaries could
exceed $500 million looking forward.117
Further, the Illinois venture capital industry led the Midwest by in-
vesting approximately $1.34 billion in 2015, and by offering the high-
est percentage of successful exits for investments in the 10 years
preceding 2015.118 Given the success that start-ups have experienced
112. See id. In Q3 2017, total early-stage deal volume was at approximately $23.07 billion
against total seed and angel deal volume of $2.16 billion.
113. Market capitalization refers to the total market value of all of a company’s shares out-
standing in the market that are available for trading, thus providing for a rough value of the
company’s value. James Chen, Market Capitalization, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia
.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp (last updated Dec. 10, 2018).
114. Ilya A. Strebulaev & Will Gornall, How Much Does Venture Capital Drive the U.S. Econ-
omy?, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS. (2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/how-much-
does-venture-capital-drive-us-economy. This study focused its findings on venture capital-backed
companies that ultimately were successful to reach an IPO, such as Apple, Starbucks, and Tesla
for example, which is an especially successful exit scenario for start-ups. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. In one study, the average developer in an early-stage start-up made an annual salary of
$110,000. Ben West, Startup Employees Don’t Earn More, 80,000 HOURS (Oct. 7, 2015), https://
80000hours.org/2015/10/startup-salaries-and-equity-compensation/. Based on 2018 federal in-
come tax brackets for a single-individual, this results in approximately $20,689.50 of potential tax
revenue per employee, or $537,927,000 of annual tax revenue given the assumption of 2,600
companies with only 10 employees.
118. 2017 Midwest Startup and Venture Capital Market Analysis, HYDE PARK ANGELS 9–16
(Aug. 2017), http://hydeparkangels.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2017-Midwest-Startup-and-
Venture-Capital-Analysis.pdf. Specifically, exits by multiple on invested capital was on average
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in the Midwest, and Chicago specifically, it makes little sense to estab-
lish tax systems that divest the industry of the incentive to continue
making progress to benefit the overall economy. In sum, Chicago has
earned its status as the Midwest’s dominant hub of venture capital and
innovation, a title, and more importantly a growing industry, that
would be compromised by the penalizing nature of the Illinois Bill.
Not only does this privilege tax undercut the risk-reward matrix for
the industry, but it would play a role in compromising the goal of the
Illinois Growth and Innovation Fund (ILGIF).119 The ILGIF is a pro-
gram originally started in 2002 that allows the Treasurer to devote up
to 1% of the State’s investment portfolio into Illinois venture capital
firms that actively invest in technology businesses.120 Where the Trea-
sury has devoted a significant amount of capital to contribute to the
growth of the State’s economy and to the creation of nearly 6,300 jobs
since the launch of the first Technology Development Account (TDA
I) in 2005, the privilege tax would then send the community mixed
signals of the State’s support of the industry.121
Considering the number of benefits that Illinois’s venture capital
industry brings to investors, start-ups, and even the State’s economy,
Illinois’s penalty tax should be viewed as an overly burdensome mea-
sure that ignores how the private funds industry helps the State more
than it hurts the State. Whether its investors who have alternatives to
investing in the public market that promote job growth—and generate
income tax revenue as a result—or the start-ups that will lose oppor-
tunities to have a funded business, it is clear that with measures like
Illinois’s privilege tax, nobody wins.
higher than any other major venture capital markets, where 81% of successful exits were be-
tween 3x and 10x the total invested capital. Id.
119. In 2016, the Illinois treasury launched their second Illinois Growth and Innovation Fund
(TDA II), which allocated over $200 million of Illinois’s investment portfolio that is to be in-
vested in Illinois venture capital funds to promote economic growth, specifically for technology
businesses. Meg Graham, Illinois to Invest $220M in Venture Funds Focused on Tech Startups,
CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 26, 2016, 12:56 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-frer
ichs-tech-venture-funds-bsi-20160126-story.html.
120. ILL. GROWTH & INNOVATION FUND, https://www.ilgif.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
121. Technology Development Account I, ILL. GROWTH & INNOVATION FUND, https://
www.ilgif.com/ilgifimpact/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). Since the inception of the ILGIF in 2002,
the TDA I fund was allotted $74 million, followed by the TDA II fund that was allotted $222
million in 2011, which now precedes the State’s plan to allocate up to 5% of the State’s invest-
ment portfolio, or over $700 million, for a subsequent fund. See ILL. GROWTH & INNOVATION
FUND, supra note 120.
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IV. IMPACT
The venture capital community is likely to respond to the threat
from Illinois’s proposed privilege tax. This Section will discuss possi-
ble responses by the GPs of venture capital funds that would mitigate
the Illinois Bill’s effects or circumvent it entirely. It is important to
note that the following scenarios are speculative—it is impossible to
predict with certainty how venture capital firms would respond to the
new legislation. Considering possible responses helps to highlight the
flaws in effectuating such a wide-impacting tax scheme. The first possi-
ble scenario examines the adjustment venture capital firms could
make to their fee structures to maximize their returns to mitigate the
effects of the Illinois Bill. The second possible scenario assesses what
amount of venture capital money could potentially be leaving Illinois
in the event the Illinois Bill is enacted.
A. Venture Capital Firms Rethink Two and Twenty
A potential response from the Illinois venture capital industry could
be these firms changing the “two and twenty” compensation model.
Two and twenty is a creature of contract, meaning firms can adjust the
compensation structure to match their needs or incentivize LPs to in-
vest in a given fund.122 For the rest of this subsection, two different fee
structures will be evaluated. The first scenario assumes 1% manage-
ment fees and 30% carried interest, where LPs pay less for the ven-
ture capital firm to keep the lights on and the fund operating in
exchange for giving up a larger cut of profits from the fund’s perform-
ance. The second scenario will assume 3% management fees and 10%
carried interest to reflect an opposite objective of the first scenario. In
both of these scenarios, the benchmark will be the hypothetical PIF
mentioned above with one single GP.123 I will calculate the sum of the
GP’s likely tax liability after ten years, assuming the GP’s only income
is the management fees and carry.
1. Lower Management Fees and More Carry
Returning to the hypothetical PIF, where the sole GP raises a $10
million fund and has returned $15 million (a $5 million profit) by Year
Ten, assume the arrangement is changed so that the GP will only take
122. In 2014, Bain Capital raised their 11th fund at $7.3 billion, and provided LPs with two fee
options, where the fees were either 0.5% management fees and 30% carried interest, or 1.5%
management fees and 20% carried interest. Arleen Jacobius, Bain Capital Closes 11th Fund at
$7.3 Billion, PENSIONS & INV. (Apr. 17, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/
20140417/ONLINE/140419858/bain-capital-closes-11th-fund-at-73-billion.
123. See hypothetical discussed supra Section II.A.
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1% in management fees in return for 30% carry from the $10 million
fund. Also, assuming the same investment activity and results in Year
Ten, the GP would have only taken $1 million over the ten years and
PIF will have $5 million in profits to be divided according to the fund’s
carry provision.
In a world where Illinois is permitted to take 20% from the GP’s
profits, the GP will take 30% ($1.5 million), which will be reduced by
the Illinois privilege tax, leaving the GP with $1.2 million and the LPs
will take 70% ($3.5 million). Over the life of this fund, the GP will
have made $1 million taxable at ordinary income rates, and $1.2 mil-
lion of income that is likely taxed as long-term capital gains, and the
LPs will have made $3.5 million, the taxing of which will depend on
who the investor is. Under this approach, the GP’s annual $100,000
management fees124 and subsequent $1.2 million carry interest will re-
sult in approximately $768,495 total tax liability after ten years, assum-
ing PIF is the GP’s only source of income.
TABLE 3. GP Tax on 1% Management Fees and 30% Carry
(One and Thirty)
Management Fees $100,000 per year
Annual Tax $18,289.50125
Sum of Tax After Ten Years $182,895.00
Illinois 20% Privilege Tax $300,000.00
Carry After Privilege Tax $1,200,000.00
23.8% Long-Term Capital Gains $285,600.00
GP’s Total Tax Liability $768,495.00
Now, this scenario would likely be embraced by LPs given that the
70% carry and savings from paying $1 million less in management fees
would actually put the LPs in a better economic position had the Illi-
nois Bill never challenged the GP’s profits. Additionally, because the
GP only takes a 1% management fee, the GP would have $9 million
124. Because the hypothetical GP’s only income comes from management fees, this would put
the GP in the 24% tax bracket according to the new GOP tax bill. 26 U.S.C. § 1(j)(2)(C) (Supp.
V 2018).
125. As used in this Section, the calculation for “Annual Tax” and “Sum of Tax After Ten
Years” refers to a hypothetical GP that comprises a single person that is taxed at the applicable
marginal income tax rates as they exist during the drafting of this Comment. Moreover, these
figures assume the same rates will apply for the entire ten-year duration of these hypotheticals.
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of investable capital to generate the $15 million in Year Ten, which
means PIF would need to return approximately 66.67% on the invest-
able $9 million, compared to the 87.5%.126 Thus, there is a greater
cushion for the GP if one of the investments does not happen to be
more successful.
However, the GP’s annual $100,000 needs to cover items like salary,
rent, and other annual expenses, making the end-result much less pos-
itive until the carry comes in. Even if this fund were to be scaled to the
size of an average fund,127 the result would likely be the same to ad-
just for expectations to invest capital in more companies and accrue
more expenses to accommodate the larger fund. A fee structure like
this, while favorable to LPs in general to maintain their expectations
for receiving carry from their alternative asset investment, could con-
tinue to dilute the available talent of GPs willing to work in Illinois
venture capital at a discount for anticipated returns from the fund.
2. Higher Management Fees and Less Carry
Again, using the hypothetical PIF and assuming that the GP takes
3% in management fees in return for 10% carry from the $10 million
fund and that the same mechanics apply, the fund will generate $3
million in management fees and produce $15 million in Year Ten. Af-
ter Illinois takes a 20% cut of the GP’s profits, or $100,000, the GP
will be left with $400,000.
In this scenario, the GP will make $3 million that is taxed as ordi-
nary income, and $400,000 that is taxed as long-term capital gains. So,
the GP of PIF’s annual $300,000 in management fees and $400,000
carry would result in approximately $1,002,088 total tax liability after
the ten-year period. Meanwhile, the LPs of PIF will receive their 90%,
or $4.5 million, that will be taxed at their respective income tax rates.
126. See hypothetical discussed supra Section II.A.
127. See 2017 PE & VC Fundraising Report, PITCHBOOK (Seattle, Wash.), Mar. 1, 2018, at 9
[hereinafter 2017 PE & VC Fundraising Report] (providing an estimate for the average size of
venture capital funds in 2017 to be $170 million).
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TABLE 4. GP Tax on 3% Management Fees and 10% Carry
(Three and Ten)
Management Fees $300,000 per year
Annual Tax $80,688.83128
Sum of Tax After Ten Years $806,888.30
Illinois 20% Privilege Tax $100,000.00
Carry $400,000.00
23.8% Long-Term Capital Gains $95,200.00
GP’s Total Tax Liability $1,002,088.30
The annual take-home with management fees that large would be
considerably more than the one and thirty fee structure, and it would
offer more upside to LPs’ profits from carry, provided the fund is suc-
cessful. Further, even though Illinois is still able to capture some reve-
nue money from the fund’s profits, there is a significant difference in
tax revenue from the ordinary income tax compared to the one and
twenty scenario that is going to the federal government instead.
A scenario like this would likely incentivize would-be venture capi-
talists to stay in the industry; however, this arrangement could make
obtaining LP funds more difficult without a proven track record of
success.129 Additionally, the GP in this scenario only has $7 million
investable capital because $3 million will be lost to management fees,
so the GP would have to return approximately 114.26% to generate
$15 million in Year Ten, compared to 87.5%.130
In light of this wrinkle in a “three and ten” fee structure, there
could be an opportunity for firms to negotiate with LPs to allow for
recycling the fund’s distributions until the committed capital has been
returned to the fund, at which point management fees would be low-
128. See discussion supra note 125.
129. One sample of data from 2009 regarding management fees of venture capital firms found
that the average management fee percentage was approximately 2.25%. Kate Litvak, Venture
Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation Arrangements, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 161, 174 (2009). Further, even an increase from 2% to 2.5% would be met with heavy
negotiation to carry out. Id. at 181. Another survey conducted in 2013 found that only 10% of
venture capital firms charged management fees that were higher than 2.5% of committed capital.
Joanna Glasner, Most VCs Don’t Have 2 Percent Fee, PE HUB NETWORK (Dec. 9, 2013), https://
www.pehub.com/2013/12/most-vcs-dont-have-2-percent-fee/. The takeaway from these two dif-
ferent studies lends little support to the practicality of PIF’s ability to charge a 3% management
fee; however, Illinois’s willingness to pass Senate Bill 1719 could change the way funds are struc-
tured in the future.
130. See hypothetical discussed supra note Section II.A.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL305.txt unknown Seq: 26 29-MAY-19 16:58
696 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:671
ered.131 The advantage to this method would allow for the fund to
reuse capital, which mitigates the lowered DPI from capital calls for
management fees, thereby enhancing the fund’s return profile.132
Moreover, instead of reusing capital from an exit to invest in more
companies, GPs could waive their management fees for a given period
in return for taking more from the exit of a company. This method
could potentially face scrutiny by the IRS, however, depending on
how the waiver is structured—whether as a management fee waiver or
as GPs taking an interest in future profits—and how the capital is
used.133 If the fund were to waive its management fees in exchange for
using profits as compensation instead, then the GPs would ideally re-
alize only long-term capital gains for the period, but the IRS’s charac-
terization and resulting tax treatment is not clear.
In the wake of attempting to limit private funds from manipulating
compensation arrangements, the IRS has proposed a regulation that
will limit funds’ ability to waive management fees and treat compensa-
tion as long-term capital gains.134 Essentially, the IRS’ goal with the
proposed regulation is to identify arrangements that are treated as dis-
guised payments for services under Internal Revenue Code Section
707(a)(2)(A).135 According to the regulation, if the interests and waiv-
ers are not subject to “significant entrepreneurial risks,” then it is
likely the IRS would characterize the transaction as one that is subject
to ordinary tax rates.136 Further, the proposed regulation provides the
necessary elements for when arrangements are disguised payments of
services:
131. “Recycling” returns would mean the capital from a distribution after selling an asset can
either be retained by the fund or used to make new investments. Kader Crawford, Fund Manag-
ers and Recycling of Capital, TRIANGLE FUNDS (Nov. 17, 2014), https://trianglefunds.com/pri
vate-investment-fund-managers-recycling-capital/.
132. Johnny Brennan, Recycling in Venture Capital, JOHNNYBRENNAN.IO (Oct. 17, 2016), http:/
/johnnybrennan.io/recycling-in-venture-capital/.
133. As provided in Section 707 of the Internal Revenue Code, there are three alternatives to
determine what a payment from a partnership to a partner can be: (1) a payment of a partner’s
distributable share, (2) guaranteed payment to a partner under Section 707(c), or (3) a payment
to a partner not in their partner capacity under Section 707(a). See William M. Funk, Carried
Interests and Tax Treatment of Fee Waivers: An Attempt at Reform in the Proposed Regulations,
18 BUS. ENTITIES, no. 4, 2016, at 14, 16 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 707 (2012)).
134. Jonathan Williamson, Management Fee Waivers: Potentials and Pitfalls for Fund Advi-
sors, COHEN & CO (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.cohencpa.com/insights/articles/management-fee-
waivers-potentials-and-pitfalls; see also Funk, supra note 133; see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-
2, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,652 (Aug. 19, 2015).
135. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2, 80 Fed. Reg. at 43,652.
136. See Williamson, supra note 134 (quoting Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2, 80 Fed. Reg. at
43,653).
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(b) Elements necessary to characterize arrangements as disguised
payments for services— (1) In general. An arrangement will be
treated as a disguised payment for services if—
(i) A person (service provider), either in a partner capacity or in
anticipation of becoming a partner, performs services (directly or
through its delegate) to or for the benefit of a partnership;
(ii) There is a related direct or indirect allocation and distribution
to such service provider; and
(iii) The performance of such services and the allocation and distri-
bution, when viewed together, are properly characterized as a trans-
action occurring between the partnership and a person acting other
than in that person’s capacity as a partner.137
To successfully waive management fees in a year and receive distri-
butions from exits subject to long-term capital gains rates, GPs would
need “sufficient entrepreneurial risk” and compliance with the pro-
posed regulation so that the payment will not be a disguised payment
for services.138 While this particular regulation is not in effect, it
should serve as notice for the venture capital industry of the IRS’s
interest in targeting the re-characterization of management fees to ob-
tain more favorable tax treatment.
B. Encouragement for Venture Capital to Leave Illinois
As Illinois presses to impose a greater tax on private funding at the
state level, one potential response from venture capital firms could be
leaving the Land of Lincoln to conduct business from neighboring
states. While determining what level of departure would result if this
bill was enacted in Illinois is something better suited for the econo-
mists, private equity professionals have already made threats to
leave.139 If even 10% of Illinois’s venture capital industry leaves the
state, the result would be a total industry size of $1.206 billion, or a
total loss of $134 million. That level of potential $134 million loss be-
gins to approach the average size of venture capital funds raised in
137. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-2, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,652. Also the proposed regulation would
impose timing requirements on the effect of the determination and inclusion, which are all deter-
mined based on the facts and circumstances. See id.
138. Whether a distribution carries significant entrepreneurial risk to the fact of payment and
the amount is ultimately “based on the likelihood that the service provider will ‘receive an allo-
cation regardless of the overall success of the business operation.’” See Funk, supra note 133.
Without diving into great detail about this proposed regulation and the administrative hurdles
GPs would need to jump in order to satisfy the requirements, it will be sufficient to understand
some of the threats GPs face to effectively re-characterize their income.
139. Lynne Marek, Governor Candidate Biss Is a Traitor, Say Private-Equity Investors,
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (June 17, 2017), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20170617/ISSUE01/
170619894/governor-candidate-biss-is-a-traitor-say-private-equity-investors.
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2016.140 Therefore, this would mean that the Illinois Bill could, by it-
self, result in the departure of enough venture capital money from the
state that an entirely new fund could be raised in Illinois. A $134 mil-
lion loss would not only result in less tax revenue via the privilege tax,
but it would also mean less tax revenue from venture capital firms’
management fees that are taxed as ordinary income.141
The next step in this scenario would then turn on answering the
question of where venture capital firms would relocate. In this case,
there is no shortage of places where the firms could relocate and keep
a strong presence in the Midwest. States like Michigan, Ohio, Mis-
souri, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Indiana have all been home to a sig-
nificant number of companies that have successfully raised venture
capital financings between 2015 and 2017.142 In addition to the neigh-
boring states being home to budding venture capital industries, their
location in the Midwest would also mitigate the risk that relocation
would displace access to the Illinois entrepreneurial network. Further,
these states to-date do not have any outstanding proposals to impose a
tax on GPs, unlike Illinois, nor does there appear to be interest in such
legislation either, which only adds to the viability of such a move
working to the benefit of GPs.
While speculating on the departure of venture capital firms may be
viewed as conjecture to some, crippling the ability of individuals to
make a profitable business for themselves and other entrepreneurs
would force the hand of those who are passionate about staying in this
industry.
V. CONCLUSION
Illinois Senate Bill 1719 is an overly disincentivizing proposal that
will likely restrict the ability of venture capitalists to provide financing
to start-ups and to stimulate both local micro-economies and broad
macro-economies. When it comes to promoting an industry that cre-
140. In 2016, 353 funds were successfully raised with a total amount of capital raised of $51.1
billion, which would make the average fund size across all of these closings approximately $145
million. 2017 PE & VC Fundraising Report, supra note 127, at 8. It is worth noting, however, that
while the average fund size was approximately $145 million, five funds in total raised over $1
billion alone, or $9.5 billion together, which represents approximately 18.59% of total venture
capital fundraising for the year, and significantly distorts the $145 million average fund size fig-
ure. 2016 Year in Review: Top 5 VC Deals, Exits & Funds, PITCHBOOK (Dec. 23, 2016), https://
pitchbook.com/news/articles/2016-year-in-review-top-5-vc-deals-exits-funds.
141. See Fleischer, supra note 27, at 9–10.
142. Jason Rowley, Here Are the Best Startup Cities in the Midwest, TECHCRUNCH, https://
techcrunch.com/2017/08/02/here-are-the-best-startup-cities-in-the-midwest/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2019).
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ates jobs and pushes innovation forward, Illinois’s proposed privilege
tax will stunt these objectives and unjustly punish the start-up industry
that already suffers from the difficulty of becoming profitable busi-
nesses. Given the valuable investment management services venture
capital firms provide to portfolio companies and LPs, taking a cut off
the top of profits robs their ability to invest more capital into progres-
sive industries and provide profitable investment options for institu-
tional investors. Moreover, Chicago’s position as the Midwest’s leader
in venture capital would be compromised from such a tax scheme.
This scheme would only push GPs away from the city when deciding
on the best region to call home and make a difference in the lives of
aspiring local entrepreneurs.
Maxwell Gawley
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